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Competition Policy And Practice In
South Africa: Promoting Competition
For Development

Trudi Hartzenberg*
I.

INTRODUCTION

South Africa's new competition policy and law were drafted during
the early years of South Africa's new democracy, a period characterized by
important domestic policy and regulatory reform.' These reforms were not
only part of the comprehensive program for the country's economic, social,
and political transformation, but also its integration into the global economy
after decades of isolation under the apartheid regime.2 In the case of
competition policy, however, concerns about specific development
challenges entrenched by the previous era of political and economic control,
had to be explicitly reflected in the new South Africa's law and policy. It
was clear that a robust competition law would only be politically possible if
the law specifically addressed public interest concerns. The core focus of
economic efficiency had to be tempered by a strong emphasis on
development.
In the end, the new competition law, even with the broad sweep of its
objectives, puts economic efficiency center-stage. Public interest objectives
are articulated alongside the goal of economic efficiency. Only as the
jurisprudence develops will the nature of the trade-offs within this nexus of
objectives become clear.
This paper reviews briefly the new 1998 Competition Act
("Competition Act" or "Act") and the institutions established to enforce the

Trudi Hartzenberg, Executive Director: Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa (tralac).
1 Rashad Cassim & Dick Ernst Van Seventer, Reform of South Africa's Merchandise
Trade Since Democracy, An Overview (2005) (paper presented at South African Economic
Policy Under Democracy Conference: A 10 Year Review, Oct. 28-29, 2005), available at
http://academic.sun.ac.za/econ/econconf/papers/Cassim.pdf.
2 Competition Act 89 of 1998, pmbl., available at http://www.info.gov.za/gazette/acts/
1998/a89-98.pdf.
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new law. The new Act marks a significant step in the development of
effective market governance in South Africa. However, much remains to
be done to develop capacity, in particular the institutional capacity for
effectively enforcing competition law, and complementary regulatory
frameworks that will support the broad competition policy objectives that
reach beyond efficiency to encompass public interest objectives. And
perhaps even more important, especially in light of recent investigations
into alleged restrictive practices and cases that have been heard, there
remains much to be done to change firm behaviour from mere maneuvering
around competition law to effective compliance.
II.

A NEW LAW AND NEW INSTITUTIONS

A key criticism by the new democratic government of the existing
South Africa's competition legislation before 1998 was that it did not
address the high levels of concentration in the economy-both in terms of
ownership and market share.3 Development concerns featured strongly in
the debates on the role of competition policy in addressing both structural
features of the economy as well as corporate behavior, especially of the
large conglomerates. 4
The challenges of addressing poverty and
unemployment were as much a part of the policy discussion as was the
promotion of competition and economic efficiency. 5
The Competition Act of 1998 and its amendments regulate competition
in all of South Africa's markets. 6 The latest amendment is the Competition
Second Amendment Act of 2000, which went into effect in February 2001 .
The Consolidated Act, incorporating all amendments, provides for the
establishment of three agencies responsible for implementing and enforcing
the regulations. 8 These are the Competition Commission, the Competition

3 DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY PRETORIA, THE EVOLUTION OF POLICY IN SOUTH
AFRICA: PROPOSED GUIDELINES FOR COMPETITION POLICY: A FRAMEWORK FOR COMPETITION,

COMPETITIVENESS AND DEVELOPMENT § 3.3 (1997), available at http://www.compcom.co.za/
aboutus/correctevolution/2CorrectThe%20Evolution%20oP/20Policy%20in%20SA.doc.
4 DAVID LEWIS, THE OBJECTIVES OF COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY AND THE OPTIMAL
DESIGN OF A COMPETITION AGENCY 4 (2003), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/57/

59/2486466.pdf.
5 Id. at 4.
6 Competition

Act 89 of 1998, available at http://www.info.gov.za/gazette/acts/
1998/a89-98.pdf.;
Competition
Amendment
Act
35
of 1999,
available at
http://www.info.gov.za/gazette/acts/1999/a35-99.pdf; Competition Amendment Act 15 of
2000, available at http://www.info.gov.za/gazette/acts/2000/a15-00.pdf;
Competition
Second Amendment Act 39 of 2000, available at http://www.info.gov.za/gazette/acts/2000/
a39-00.pdf.
7 Competition
Act
89
of 1998,
pmbl.
(amended
2001),
available at
http://www.compcom.co.za/thelaw/ConsolidatedAct.doc.
I Id. at ch. 4.
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Tribunal, and the Competition Appeal Court. 9
The 1998 Competition Act covers all economic activity in South
Africa and has extra-territorial reach to the extent that the Act applies to "all
economic activity within, or having an effect within, the Republic." 10 The
purpose of the Competition Act's emphasis, in addition to the promotion of
"efficiency, adaptability and development of the economy,"'" is the
promotion of small business development, greater participation in the
economy (especially by previously disadvantaged individuals), and the
promotion of a greater spread of ownership. 12 The Act thus attempts to
balance efficiency concerns and broader development priorities within the
competition framework.
Small and medium-sized enterprise ("SME") development is important
because of the structure of the South African economy. High levels of
concentration and the conglomerate structure of business in many sectors,
from mining to manufacturing to services, are important challenges for
small business development in South Africa that are above and beyond the
common challenges that SMEs face. The conglomerate structure of
business in South Africa and the strong vertical linkages that exist in many
industries can prove to be effective barriers to entry for smaller enterprises.
Promoting a broader spread of ownership, especially among
historically disadvantaged persons, reflects concerns about the skewed
distribution of income and wealth in South Africa. 13 For many decades
South Africa had one of the most unequal distributions of income in the
world, with strong racial fault lines through the distribution. 14 Black
economic empowerment is now an important cross-cutting policy issue."
9 Id. at ch 4, s. 19, 26, 36; see generally About Us: Competition Commission,
(last
http://www.compcom.co.za/aboutus/aboutuscompetition commissionoverview.asp
visited April 10, 2006); see generally About Us: Competition Tribunal,
http://www.compcom.co.za/aboutus/aboutus-competition-tribunal.asp (last visited April 10,
2006); see generally About Us: Competition Appeal Court, http://www.compcom.co.za/
aboutus/aboutuscompetition-appeal-court.asp asp (last visited April 10, 2006).
10 Competition Act 89 of 1998, ch. 1, s. 3(1) (amended 2001), available at
http://www.compcom.co.za/thelaw/ConsolidatedAct.doc.
at s. 2(a).
i
"Id.
12LEWIS, supra note 4, at 5; Competition Act 89 of 1998, ch. 1, s. 2 (amended 2001),
availableat http://www.compcom.co.za/thelaw/ConsolidatedAct.doc.
13 See generally Benjamin Roberts, 'Empty Stomachs, Empty Pockets ': Poverty and
Inequality in Post-apartheidSouth Africa, in STATE OF THE NATION: SOUTH AFRICA 20042005 479 (John Daniel et al. eds., 2005), available at http://www.hsrcpublishers.co.za/
seruploads/tblPDF/2055 18_State of theNation_2004-2005-16112004111750AM.pdf.
14 ANDREW WHITEFORD & MICHAEL MCGRATH, THE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME IN SOUTH

AFRICA (1994).
15 President Thabo Mbeki, Address at the Second Joint Sitting of the Third Democratic
Parliament, Cape Town (Feb. 11, 2005), availableat http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/
beki/2005/tm0211 .html.
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A more even spread of ownership and SME promotion are important to
ensure long-term, balanced, and sustainable development. These specific
development challenges are articulated in the public interest issues included
in the Competition Act.
The Competition Act provides for extensive jurisdictional coverage,
which is important from a developmental perspective. Extra-territorial
reach is also provided for, to the extent that the Act applies to "all economic
activity within, or having an effect within, the Republic."' 6 The nature and
scope of this extra-territorial reach was tested in a recent case, involving the
export of soda ash from the United States to Botswana. 17 Both Botswana
and South Africa are members of the Southern African Customs Union
("SACU") and share a common external tariff.18 Hence, imports into
Botswana can be expected to have an effect within South Africa. Reference
to extra-territorial scope is also found in a recent consent order, this time
looking at the impact on South African exports to the United States. 19 The
Competition Commission investigated allegations by South African citrus
exporters that the USA Citrus Alliance was indirectly fixing the selling
price of citrus in the United States.2 ° South African citrus exporters argued
that this conduct had an impact within South Africa. 2, These cases point to
very important challenges to competition law enforcement in SACU. To
date, only South Africa has a policy, law, and a competition authority to
enforce the law. The other members of SACU are at various stages of
developing policy, drafting laws and regulations, and establishing
authorities. Namibia is most advanced in this process, having appointed
commissioners of the Namibian Competition Commission; when funding
becomes available the Commission will become operational.

16 Competition Act 89 of 1998, ch. 1, s. 3(1) (amended 2001), available at
http://www.compcom.co.za/thelaw/ConsolidatedAct.doc.

17 Competition Comm'n v. Botswana Ash (Pty) Ltd. 2001

Case 49/CR/AprOO and

87/CR/SepOO, Competition Tribunal, (S. Afr.), available at http://www.comptrib.co.za/
decidedcases/pdf/49CRAAPROO-2pdf.pdf (ruling on the effect of an American export cartel
of soda ash to Botswana).
18For information on the Southern African Customs Union, see Final SACU Agreement,
Bots.-Lesotho-Namib.-S. Afr-Swaz, Nov. 22, 2002, available at http://www.tralac.org/
scripts/content.php?id=96 1.
'9 Competition Comm'n v. U.S.A. Citrus Alliance 2005 Case 67/CR/JuO5, Competition
Comm'n & Competition Tribunal, (S. Aft.), available at http://www.comptrib.co.za/
decidedcases/pdf/67CRJu1O5.pdf.
21 Id. at 2-3.
21 Id.

CompetitionPolicy And PracticeIn South Africa

26:667 (2006)

III. INSTITUTIONAL ARCHITECTURE FOR COMPETITION
REGULATION
The Competition Act provides for three agencies to enforce and
implement competition regulations. The Competition Commission, the
Competition Tribunal, and the Competition Appeal Court have exclusive
jurisdiction over competition matters.
A. Competition Commission
The Competition Commission ("Commission") is the investigatory
agency. It is an autonomous statutory body that monitors competition and
market transparency by investigating anti-competitive conduct. 22 It is
empowered to investigate, control, and evaluate restrictive practices and
abuse of dominant position, as well as mergers and acquisitions.23 The
Commission is independent from the Department of Trade and Industry,
and its decisions may be appealed to the Competition Tribunal and the
Competition Appeal Court.24 This is very different from the situation of the
previous Competition Board. The Competition Board, which existed until
1999, functioning under the Maintenance and Promotion of Competition
Act of 1979, was basically an administrative body within the Department of
Trade and Industry.25 The Board could only make recommendations to the
Minister of Trade, who would make the final decision on any competition
matter.26 The 1979 Act granted the Board extensive scope to investigate
both mergers and restrictive practices. 27 However, with effective decisionmaking resting with the Minister, it was to be expected that political
dictates would lead to challenges to credibility and consistency.
B. Competition Tribunal
The Competition Tribunal is the decision-maker of first instance,
adjudicating matters referred to it by the Commission and by the
complainant who, under Section 51(3) and (4) of the Competition Act, can
refer matters directly to the Tribunal, subject to the Tribunal's rules of
procedure, after a decision of non-referral has been made by the
22 Competition
Act 89 of 1998, ch. 4 (amended 2001), available at
http://www.compcom.co.za/thelaw/ConsolidatedAct.doc.
23 Competition
Comm'n,
Functions,
http://www.compcom.co.za/aboutus/

aboutuscompetitionscommission function.asp?level=3&child=2&desc=9 (last visited Apr.
6, 2006).
24 Competition
Act 89 of 1998, ch. 4 (amended 2001), available at
http://www.compcom.co.za/thelaw/ConsolidatedAct.doc.
25 Maintenance and Promotion of Competition Act 96 of 1979 (amended 1996), available
at http://www.compcom.co.za/thelaw/ helawact maintenance.asp?level=l&child=3.
26

Id. at s. 10.

27 id.
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Commission.28

In brief, the key functions of the Tribunal are to grant exemptions,
authorize or prohibit large mergers, 29 and adjudicate prohibited practices
and mergers under Chapters 2 and 3 of the Act respectively. 30 The Tribunal
also acts as an appellate body for decisions of the Commission and
may
3
grant orders for costs on matters presented to it by the Commission. '
C. Competition Appeal Court
The Competition Appeal Court may consider any appeal or review of a
decision of the Tribunal. It may confirm, amend, or set aside any decision
or order; the Court can then give any judgment or make any order that the
circumstances require.
The new institutional architecture of South Africa's competition
regime, in theory, provides for a much more robust implementation of
competition law. Effective enforcement will only be possible, however, if
the competition institutions, as well as other institutions, both as promoters
of competition and beneficiaries of competition, have capacity to notify the
competition authorities of anti-competitive practices, as well as to
participate effectively in enforcement processes. This includes the newly
established sector regulators, which share responsibility for competition
matters in specific sectors.
IV. COMPETITION AND REGULATION: DEVELOPING A
WORKABLE INTERFACE
Accompanying the debate on competition policy during the early
phase of South Africa's new democratic era was a strong emphasis on other
aspects of regulatory reform. Given the significant role of government in
the economy, for example through state-owned enterprises during the
apartheid era, this was not surprising. Sector regulation, the establishment
of sector regulators, and specific provisions reflecting development
concerns, such as access to telecommunications and energy services, were
28 See,

Nationwide Poles v. Sasol (Oil) Pty Ltd. 2005 Case 72/CR/DecO3, Competition

Tribunal, (S. Afr.) availableat http://www.comptrib.co.za/decidedcases/html/72CRDec03.
htm (describing a case of alleged price discrimination referred by a complainant to the
Tribunal after a non-referral decision by the Commission); see also, Sasol Oil (Pty) Ltd v.
Nationwide Poles CC 2005 Case 49/CAC/AprO5, Competition Tribunal at 38-41 (S. Afr.),
available at http://www.comptrib.co.za/AC/Sasol%20Nationwide%2049CACAprO5.pdf
(overturning the Competition Appeal Court).
29 The Commission has first-instance jurisdiction over smaller mergers. See Competition
Act 89 of 1998, ch. 4, s. 21 (amended 2001), available at http://www.compcom.co.za/
thelaw/ConsolidatedAct.doc
30 Id. at chs. 2-3. (Prohibited Practices & Merger Control).
31 Id. at ch. 4, s. 27 & ch. 5 s. 57.
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very much on the regulatory reform agenda.
The 1998 Competition Act, prior to the amendments of 1999, 2000,
and 2001, excluded "acts subject to or authorized by other legislation." 32 A
proposed merger between two large players in the financial services sector
(Nedcor and Stanbic) brought to the fore the implications of this exclusion.
The Supreme Court of Appeal (not the Competition Appeal Court) reached
the conclusion that the proposed merger transaction was not subject to the
jurisdiction of the competition law as a consequence of this provision. As a
result of this case, the Act was amended to provide for concurrent
jurisdiction between the Competition Authorities and Sector Regulators.33
In the interest of consistent application of the Competition Act across
all sectors, the functions of the Commission were also broadened by the
Competition Second Amendment Act of 2000. 34 To promote interaction
and cooperation between Sector Regulators and the Competition
Authorities, the amendment requires that the Commission enter into
agreements with the other sector regulators and make provision for the
exercise of concurrent jurisdiction. 35 The exact jurisdictional boundaries
are therefore not a matter of law but are agreed upon by the two parties.
In brief, three sector regulators are considered in this paper: the
Independent Communications Authority of South Africa ("ICASA"), the
National Electricity Regulator ("NER"), and the Postal Regulator ("PR").
A. The Independent Communications Authority of South Africa
The ICASA's mandate is derived from four statutes: the ICASA Act of
2000,36 The Independent Broadcasting Act of 1993,37 the Broadcasting Act
of 1999,38 and the Telecommunications Act of 1996.39 Under the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, ICASA regulates the telecommunication
and broadcasting sectors in the public interest.40 The Independent

32

Id at ch. 1, s. 3(1)(d).

33 Id. at ch. 1, s. 3(1)(e), 3(1A)(a).
34Competition Second Amendment Act 39 of 2000, availableat http://www.info.gov.za/
gazette/acts/2000/a39-00.pdf
35 Id. at ch. 1, s. 3(1A)(b).
36 Independent Communications Authority of South Africa Act 13 of 2000, available at

http://www.icasa.org.za/Manager/ClientFiles/Documents/Icasa Act.pdf.
37Independent
Broadcasting Authority Act
153 of 1993, available at
http://www.info.gov.za/acts/1993/al 53-93.pdf.
38Broadcasting Act 4 of 1999, available at http://www.info.gov.za/gazette/acts/1999/a499.pdf
39Telecommunications Act 103 of 1996, available at http://www.info.gov.za/acts/1996/
a103-96.pdf.
40 Id. at ch. 2.
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Broadcasting Act of 199341 empowers the Authority to deal with the
approval of merger transactions, including:
*managing and facilitating cooperation and consultation in matters
dealt with by each regulator;
"issue licenses to providers of telecommunication services and
broadcasters;
*monitor the environment and enforce compliance with rules,
regulations, and policies;
s hear and decide on disputes and complaints brought by industry or
members of the public against licensees;

"plan, control, and manage the frequency spectrum; and
*protect consumers from unfair business
42 practices, poor quality
services and harmful or inferior products.
The ICASA and the Commission signed a Memorandum of
Understanding ("MOU") that became effective as of September 16, 2002. 43
The aim of the Agreement (according to the draft MOU that is available on
the ICASA website) 44 was to establish how the parties will interact with
respect to the investigation, evaluation, and analysis of mergers and
acquisitions, and complaints involving telecommunication and broadcasting
matters.
If a merger requires the approval of both regulatory authorities, then
parties are required to submit separate and concurrent applications to each
authority.45 Each authority will make independent determinations based on
their respective legislative requirements, though they may consult during
the process.
With respect to complaints, the jurisdictional boundaries identified in
the draft MOU provide that the Commission deal with horizontal and
vertical restrictive practices, as well as the abuse of a dominant position.4 6
The draft MOU also specifies rules of procedure in cases of concurrent
jurisdiction that ensure that the recipient regulator will inform the other of
41Independent
Broadcasting Authority Act 153 of 1993, available at
http://www.info.gov.za/acts/1993/aI 53-93.pdf.
42 About ICASA-Overview, http://www.icasa.org.za/Content.aspx?Page=17 (last visited
Feb. 13, 2006).
43 Memorandum of Agreement Entered into Between the Competition Commission of
South Africa and the Independent Communications Authority of South Africa, GN 1747 of
16 September 2002, available at http://www.info.gov.za/gazette/notices/2002/23857.pdf.
44 See Telecommunications Act, supra note 39.
41 See id.
46 See Draft Memorandum of Agreement Entered into Between the Competition
Commission of South Africa and the Independent Communications Authority of South
Africa § 3.1 (Apr. 23, 2002), available at http://www.icasa.org.za/Manager/ClientFiles/
Documents/DraftMoAICASAandCompComm_230402.pdf.
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any complaint and inform any complainant that the matter will be discussed
jointly with the other regulator.
A Joint Working Committee was
established in the draft MOU. Its functions include:
*,managing and facilitating cooperation and consultation in matters
dealt with by each regulator, as specified in the MOU;
*proposing amendments to the MOU when necessary; and
* advising the management of both authorities on matters affecting
48
competition in the telecommunications and broadcasting sector.
ICASA has also entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with
the Lesotho Communications Authority. 49 They agree to cooperate on the

coordination of radio transmission spillovers and to establish a forum to
discuss cross-border coordination of radio-communication systems. 50 It is
to be expected that in the customs union, SACU-of which South Africa
and Lesotho are members-discussions on coordination and cooperation of
regulatory enforcement will expand. The new SACU Agreement of 2002
requires that common policies be developed in key areas, including
industrial policy, and that countries cooperate in enforcement of
competition law.5 1 The only country with a functional Competition
Authority is South Africa. Namibia enacted a competition law in 2003,52
and commissioners have been appointed, but the Namibian Competition
Commission is not yet operational.
B. The National Electricity Regulator
The NER was established by the Electricity Act of 1987 to regulate
and control the supply of electricity.53 It is authorized to deal with merger
transactions and complaints involving electricity and other licensees, as

47

Id. § 3.3.

48 Id. §§ 4.1-4.2.
49 Memorandum of Understanding

on Co-ordination on Telecommunications and
Broadcasting Services between Independent Communications Authority of South Africa and
Lesotho
Telecommunications
Authority
(Feb.
14,
2002),
available at
http://www.icasa.org.za/Manager/ClientFiles/Documents/MOU_-_LTAICASA.pdf.
'0 Id. at art. 1(a).
51 Final SACU Agreement, pt. 8, Bots.-Lesotho-Namib.-S. Afr-Swaz, Nov. 22, 2002,
availableat http://www.tralac.org/scripts/content.php?id=961.
52 Promulgation of Competition Act 2003 (Act No. 2 of 2003) of the Parliament, GN 92
of 24 April 2003, available at http://www.parliament.gov.na/parlidocs/ACT511.pdf; see
generally Trudi Hartzenberg, Competition Policyfor Namibia: Promoting Fair Competition
and Economic Development, 4 NEPRU POLICY BRIEF (Feb. 2003) (describing Competition
Act, 2003), available at http://www.nepru.org.na/index.php?id=51.
53 Electricity
Act 41
of 1987,
s. 3 (amended
1996), available at

http://www.finance.gov.za/mfma/Electricity-Act.pdf.
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well as consumer complaints. 54 The regulator can:
(a) issue licenses for the generation, provision and, within the area
determined by it, distribution of electricity;
(b) determine the prices at and conditions on which electricity may be
supplied by a licensee;
(c) at the request of any licensee or its consumer settle disputes between
licensees among themselves or between licensees and their consumers or
prospective consumers regarding(i) the right to supply;
(ii) the quality of such supply and the provision of services in
connection therewith;
(iii) the conditions on and prices at which electricity is supplied;
(iv) the installation and functioning of meters;
(v) the suitability of the equipment of the licensee;
(vi) delays in or refusal of supply by a licensee;
(vii) any other matter in respect to which a licensee or its consumer
requests the regulator to act as mediator;
(d) collect information which it deems necessary from undertakers or
consumers;
(e) perform inspections of the equipment of licensees;
(f) exercise the other
55 powers assigned to it by [the Electricity] Act or the
Eskom Act, 1987.
Additionally, "[t]he regulator may advise the Minister of Minerals and
Energy on any matter relating to the electricity industry, and it may for this
purpose carry
out such investigations as it or the Minister deems
56
necessary.,
The NER was also engaged in the investigation to establish a regional
electricity regulator for the Southern African Development Community
("SADC") territory.
A Regional Electricity Regulatory Association
("RERA") was established in May 2002 to assist in establishing
independent regulatory authorities in the Southern African region and
harmonizing legal and regulatory frameworks for the regulation of
electricity interconnection and trade between SADC countries.

54See NERSA Profile: Focus, http://www.ner.org.za/nersa-profile.htm#8 (last visited
Apr. 10, 2006).
55Electricity Act 41 of 1987, s. 4(1) (amended 1996), available at
http://www.finance.gov.za/mfma/Electricity-Act.pdf.
56 See id. at s. 4(4).

676
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C. The Postal Regulator
The Postal Regulator, which was established under the Postal Services
Act of 1998, is not empowered to deal with competition matters but it is
envisioned that some matters over which it has jurisdiction may raise
specific competition concerns. 7 The Memorandum of Understanding
between the Competition Commission and the PR, signed on August 24,
2004, recognizes that the PR is not empowered to deal with competition
matters but that even so, there may be regulatory matters that raise
competition concerns or competition issues that may need to be taken into
account by the sector regulator. 8
The memorandum specifies that matters prohibited under chapter 2 of
the Competition Act shall be lodged with the Commission, and if the
Commission receives any complaint related to the postal industry, it shall
notify the PR. The PR is required to notify the Commission within one
month regarding whether or not the PR believes that a matter, or part
thereof, would fall within its jurisdiction. Under the agreement, a Joint
Working Committee shall be established to:
*manage and facilitate cooperation and consultation in respect of
matters dealt with by each regulatory authority;
* propose, when necessary, any amendment to the memorandum; and
e advise the management
59 of both the Commission and PR on issues
affecting competition.
D. The Regulators' Forum
In addition to the Memoranda of Agreement, the sector regulators
established a Regulators' Forum in March 2002, which they envisioned
would deal with the fragmented and sometimes contradictory approaches to
competition matters. The forum facilitates a process of information sharing
and discussion of common issues to avoid overlaps, duplication, or even
contradicting activities. The forum got off to an enthusiastic start in 2002;
however, this momentum has not been maintained. In the 2003-2004
Annual Report of the Competition Commission, the Commissioner
attributed this to the "fragmented nature of the regulato framework" and
called for "greater convergence in regulatory processes., 6
57Postal Services Act 124 of 1998, ch. 2, available at http://www.polity.org.za/html/
govdocs/legislation/1998/act 124.pdf.
58Memorandum of Agreement Entered into Between the Competition Commission and
the Postal Regulator, GN 1805 of 24 August 2004, available at http://www.info.gov.za/
gazette/notices/2004/26712.pdf.

59Id.
60 COMPETITION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA, 2003/2004 COMPETITION COMMISSION OF

SOUTH AFRICA ANNUAL REPORT 10 (2004), available at http://www.compcom.co.za/
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V. CAPACITY FOR EFFECTIVE ENFORCEMENT
Effective competition and regulatory enforcement requires very
specific capacities, not only within the enforcement agencies, but also
within the private sector, the legal and economics professions, and among
consumers. Limited capacity can lead to challenges of regulatory capture
by a small number of experts, weak enforcement and monitoring of
decisions, and can hamper the development of a competition culture.
A. Capacity in the Legal Profession and Private Sector
The capacity that has developed in the legal profession is worth noting.
Less than a decade ago, very few law firms had any expertise in
competition law. Now all major law firms and many smaller ones have
expertise in this area, and some are even taking on economists as associates.
It may soon be commonplace that law degrees that specialize in competition
law include studies in relevant economics courses and vice versa.
Small businesses still lack awareness of the importance of competition
law to their business. Given the high levels of market concentration, the
role of small businesses and their ability to compete with larger business is
a serious concern of competition law. The case of Nationwide Poles v.
Sasol is instructive. 6' This case, involving alleged price discrimination,
received a decision of non-referral from the Commission. The managing
director of Nationwide Poles then took the case to the Tribunal without
legal assistance. The experience of this small business has raised a number
of very important issues, including the cost of legal expertise to support a
competition case, the specialized knowledge required to meet the high
standards of the competition authorities with respect to submissions and
participation in proceedings, and the length of time it may take to get a case
resolved. The managing director of Nationwide Poles has documented his
experience and provided very 62useful information for small firms
considering competition litigation.
B. Academia, Trade Unions, and Consumer Organizations
Competition expertise in law, economics, and business more generally
can contribute to developing awareness of competition issues, compliance,
and better enforcement. The response in academia to the development of
competition law and regulation has been a significant increase in the
resources/annual%20report%200304/pdf/cc%20annual%20report%201 .pdf.
61 Nationwide Poles v. Sasol (Oil) Pty Ltd. 2005 Case 72/CR/DecO3, Competition
Tribunal, (S. Afr.), availableat http://www.comptrib.co.za/decidedcases/html/72CRDec03.
htm.
62Nationwide Poles & Jim Foot, Comphelp: Unfair Competition and Antitrust Help for

South African Companies(2005), http://www.comphelp.co.za.
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number of post-graduate level courses that include competition law and
policy, and sector regulation, both in law and economics, as well as a strong
research focus in both disciplines.
Trade unions are taking more interest in competition matters,
specifically in regard to mergers. Their interest in the employment impact
of mergers is obvious, and therefore their participation in merger
proceedings is most welcome. However, with their broad mandate to look
after worker interests, restrictive practices investigations could be even
more important.
The consumer constituency is weakly organized in South Africa,
despite the important role that consumer boycotts played during the
apartheid years. This is a particular challenge in view of the role of the still
very powerful state-owned enterprises in key sectors of the economy, such
as transport, telecommunications, and energy, and the importance of the
basic services provided by these enterprises.
C. Skills Constraints in the Competition Commission
The Competition Commission faces the challenge of attracting and
keeping skilled staff. Competition experts who have worked at the
Commission, gaining experience and building valuable networks, have
become very attractive to law firms, consulting firms, and larger businesses.
While this is problematic for the Commission, which invests in training and
on-the-job learning only to lose these experts, it is important to focus on
broader, economy-wide effects. The migration of competition expertise
from the Commission undoubtedly poses significant challenges for the
conduct of its investigatory function. However, having such expertise in
other sectors of the economy may lead to the development of a better
understanding of the role of competition in the economy and in
development.
Success stories on the part of the Commission are still too few,
especially in restrictive practices cases. Developing capacity to address
difficult issues such as these will substantially strengthen the Commission.
Judging by a number of recent investigations concerning alleged restrictive
practices, such as those in the automotive and airline industries,
opportunities exist to achieve visible success stories.
D. Case Load for the Commission and the Tribunal
The staff turnover of the Tribunal has, in contrast to the Commission,
been very low. This has helped build a strong institution that commands
the respect of business, government, and international institutions.
Tables 1, 2, and 3 below summarize the case activity of the
Commission and the Tribunal in recent years. It is true that resource
application has been concentrated on review of merger transactions;
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however, more recently restrictive practices cases have increased, as the
data indicates. This reflects the increased capacity within the Commission
in particular and greater awareness in the private sector and the general
public as to the role of competition law and policy and the ease with which
complaints can be brought to the Commission and even directly referred to
the Competition Tribunal, if the Commission does not refer the case. A
very important recent case involving South African Airways ("SAA")
demonstrates how the Commission and the Tribunal have now focused
more seriously on restrictive practices. The SAA abuse of dominance case
considered an incentive scheme that the airline offered to travel agents.63
SAA's dominance was not contested and the scheme effectively meant that
other airlines were severely disadvantaged. A fine of 45 million South
African Rands, which is approximately $7.5 million in U.S. dollars, was
imposed. SAA has paid the fine without appeal. 64 This case reflects a more
robust approach by the Commission to pursue restrictive practices in key
markets.
TABLE 1: MERGER DECISIONS BY THE COMMISSION
(2001-2004)65
Year

Total

Total number

Total cases

Approved

Approved with

notifications

prohibited

withdrawn/no

without

conditions

jurisdiction

conditions

2001/2002

220

2

10

213

0

2002/2003

211

1

7

194

5

2003/2004

284

1

8

262

7

63 Competition Comm'n v. South African Airways (Pty) Ltd. 2003 Case 18/CR/Mar01,
Competition Tribunal, (S. Afr.), availableathttp://www.comptrib.co.za/decidedcases/html/

18CRMarO 1%20Interlocutory.htm.
64

Competition Comm'n v. South African Airways (Pty) Ltd. 2003 Case 18/CR/Mar01,

Competition Tribunal, (S. Afr.); SABCnews.com, SAA to pay R45 million fine (Dec. 5,
2005), http://www.sabcnews.com/ conomy/business/0,2172,117530,00.html.
65 Source: Compiled using information from several annual reports of the Competition
Commission of South Africa. See COMPETITION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA, 2003/2004
COMPETITION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA ANNUAL REPORT (2004), available at
http://www.compcom.co.za/resources/publications-annualreports.asp;
see COMPETITION
COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA, 2002/2003 COMPETITION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA
ANNUAL
REPORT
(2003),
available
at
http://www.compcom.co.za/resources/
publications annualreports.asp; see COMPETITION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA, 2001/2002
COMPETITION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA ANNUAL REPORT (2002), available at
http://www.compcom.co.za/resources/publications annualreports.asp.
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TABLE 2: LARGE MERGER DECISIONS OF THE COMPETITION
TRIBUNAL (1999-2004)66
Year

Total decisions

Approved

Approved with

without

conditions

Prohibited

conditions

1999-2000

14

14

0

0

2000-2001

35

29

4

2

2001-2002

42

38

3

1

2002-2003

62

57

4

1

2003-2004

60

51

9

0

The large proportion of mergers approved without conditions raises
important questions. If the majority of mergers are in fact unconditionally
approved, is the current allocation of resources to the oversight of mergers
justified? The focus on merger control provides some insight into the
relative importance of the public interest objectives within the ambit of
competition policy in South Africa. Although the above record indicates
that public interest concerns are unlikely to trounce economic efficiency in
a merger evaluation, the growing participation of trade unions, as well as
the increasing analysis given to assess the impact of a merger on
employment, for example, indicates that competition law and policy should
be aligned with the country's broader development policy.
The number of complaint referrals to the Tribunal, as seen in Table 3
below, is dwarfed by the number of mergers.

66 Source: Compiled using information

from the several

annual

reports

of the

Competition Commission of South Africa. See COMPETITION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA,
2003/2004 COMPETITION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA ANNUAL REPORT (2004), available
at http://www.compcom.co.za/resources/publications-annualreports.asp; see COMPETITION
COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA, 2002/2003 COMPETITION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA
http://www.compcom.co.za/resources/
at
available
(2003),
REPORT
ANNUAL
publications-annualreports.asp; see COMPETITION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA, 2001/2002
COMPETITION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA ANNUAL REPORT (2002), available at

http://www.compcom.co.za/resources/publications-annualreports.asp;

see

COMPETITION

COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA, 2000/2001 COMPETITION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA

http://www.compcom.co.za/resources/
available
at
(2001),
REPORT
ANNUAL
publications-annualreports.asp; see COMPETITION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA, 1999/2000
COMPETITION

COMMISSION OF

SOUTH AFRICA ANNUAL

REPORT

http://www.compcom.co.za/resources/publications-annualreports.asp.

(2000), available at
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TABLE 3: COMPETITION COMPLAINT REFERRALS TO AND
DECISIONS BY THE TRIBUNAL IN RESTRICTIVE PRACTICES
CASES (1999-2004)67
Year

Referrals
Competition

Complainant

Decisions, including

Commission

consent orders

1999-2000

0

1

5

2000-2001

11

8

11

2001-2002

6

3

5

2002-2003

5

6

6

2003-2004

4

11

5

E. Enforcement Challenges Related to Concurrent Jurisdiction
Jurisdictional conflicts could pose problems for effective enforcement
too. As indicated, only three Memoranda of Understanding have been
concluded between the Commission and the relevant sector regulators.
Much work remains to develop capacity within the sector regulators. Such

67 Source:

Compiled

using

information

from

the

several

annual

reports

of the

Competition Commission of South Africa, and several annual reports of the Competition
Tribunal of South Africa. See COMPETITION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA, 2003/2004
COMPETITION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA ANNUAL REPORT (2004), available at
http://www.compcom.co.za/resources/publications-annualreports.asp;
see
COMPETITION
COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA, 2002/2003 COMPETITION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA

ANNUAL
REPORT
(2003),
available
at
http://www.compcom.co.za/resources/
publications annualreports.asp; see COMPETITION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA, 2001/2002
COMPETITION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA ANNUAL REPORT (2002), available at
http://www.compcom.co.za/resources/publications-annualreports.asp;
see COMPETITION
COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA, 2000/2001 COMPETITION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA
ANNUAL
REPORT
(2001),
available
at
http://www.compcom.co.za/resources/

publications annualreports.asp; see COMPETITION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA, 1999/2000
COMPETITION

COMMISSION OF

SOUTH AFRICA

http://www.compcom.co.za/resources/publications

ANNUAL

REPORT

annualreports.asp;

(2000),

available at

see

COMPETITION

TRIBUNAL OF SOUTH AFRICA, 2003/2004 COMPETITION TRIBUNAL OF SOUTH AFRICA ANNUAL

REPORT (2004), available at http://www.comptrib.co.za/Publications/Annual%20Report/
Annual%20report0/o202003-4.pdf; see COMPETITION TRIBUNAL OF SOUTH AFRICA, 2002/2003
COMPETITION

TRIBUNAL

OF

SOUTH

AFRICA

ANNUAL

REPORT

(2003),

available at

http://www.comptrib.co.za/Publications/Annual%20Report/Annual%20report%2020023.pdf; see COMPETITION TRIBUNAL OF SOUTH AFRICA, 2001/2002 COMPETITION TRIBUNAL OF

SOUTH AFRICA ANNUAL REPORT (2002), available at http://www.comptrib.co.za/
Publications/Annual%20Report/Annual%20report%202001-2.pdf,
see
COMPETITION
TRIBUNAL OF SOUTH AFRICA, 2000/2001 COMPETITION TRIBUNAL OF SOUTH AFRICA ANNUAL

REPORT (2001), available at http://www.comptrib.co.za/Publications/Annual%20Report/
Annual%20report%202000- l.pdf; see COMPETITION TRIBUNAL OF SOUTH AFRICA, 1999/2000
COMPETITION

TRIBUNAL

OF

SOUTH

AFRICA

ANNUAL

REPORT

(2000),

available at

http://www.comptrib.co.za/Publications/Annual%20Report/Annual%20report%201999-

2000.pdf.
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capacity would also assist to develop a workable interface with the
Competition Authorities, which does not yet exist.
In key sectors such as telecommunications and energy, the promotion
of a competitive environment through effective enforcement of both sectorspecific and competition-related regulation is important. The impact of
competitive outcomes in terms of pricing, and access to quality service and
consumer choice on the overall performance of the economy, is likely to be
significant, perhaps especially on small business development. Of course,
for both sectors the issue of privatization is still a weighty one. In the case
of telecommunications, the process has been slow and fraught with
bureaucratic complications. In short, privatization has not been focused on
the development of a more competitive industry but rather on the
imperative that asset values be increased in preparation for privatization.
The energy sector is a particularly interesting example. "Following the first
democratic revolution in 1994, emphasis was given to electrification,
improvements in electricity distribution, the creation of an independent
regulator and the co~,oratization of Eskom [the South African Electricity
Supply Company]."''
Work on the development and design of a
competitive electricity market has continued during the past decade.
VI. STRUCTURAL AND BEHAVIORAL LEGACIES: CHALLENGES
FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF A COMPETITION CULTURE
In many of its industries and sectors, South Africa does not have a
competitive environment that can support economic decisions by firms,
investors, and consumers that will aggregate to produce robust and
sustainable economic growth. Anti-competitive practices are, arguably, far
more prevalent than the record of cases coming before the Competition
Authorities thus far indicates. This is part of the legacy of the apartheid era
on South Africa's development where the state played a significant role
both as producer and regulator. The effects of strong state intervention and
participation in markets were magnified by economic sanctions that limited
the participation of South African firms in the international economy.
Import substitution industrialization was the dominant paradigm both by
design and the result of economic sanctions. Consumer choice was
constrained by virtual autarky.
Investment options were severely limited and led to investment
patterns by firms which supported the development of a conglomerate
structure of ownership in the South African economy. The pervasive role

68Anton Eberhard, The PoliticalEconomy of Power Sector Reform in South Africa 1-39
(Programme on Energy and Sustainable Development, Stanford University, Working Paper
WP-06,
2004),
available at
http://www.gsb.uct.ac.za/gsbwebb/mir/documents/
StanfordPSREberhardSep2004final.pdf.
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of the government in productive economic activities and recent experience
with privatization testifies to the government's important role in the
economy.
In particular, the protectionist policies, such as import
substitution and industrialization supported by exchange controls,
compounded by the effects of isolation during the height of apartheid,
meant that South African businesses faced very little competition from
imports, while also having limited investment opportunities outside the
country.

Many firms invested in sectors and industries far removed from their
core business because they could not take advantage of investment
opportunities abroad. Corporate concentration grew and the conglomerate
structure of South African business was consolidated with cross-holdings
that characterized ownership structures.
The structure of holding
companies, which grants effective control over subsidiaries with extremely
low ownership stakes, is specific to South Africa and poses interesting
challenges when assessing the impact of a proposed merger.69
Practices in a range of sectors, from automotive to real estate, have
recently come under scrutiny and more often than not the conclusion that
these practices restrict competition has not come as a surprise to consumers.
Indications are that a systematic review of key sectors would uncover many
more such practices which seemingly raised no concerns with the
Competition Board in the previous era.
Developing a competition culture takes time and requires input from
many different sources. The Competition Commission can expand its
advocacy role, provided that it has adequate resources. There is also a role
for greater focus on competition issues in the various government
departments. For example, those departments that have been involved in
domestic regulatory reform, such as the Communications, Minerals and
Energy, and Health Departments, need to bolster their expertise in the field
of competition. Then those departments can support the development of a
competitive environment in their specific industries.
Consumers are both promoters and beneficiaries of competition, so
their role in competition enforcement cannot be underestimated. Consumer
awareness and their capacity to play a role in effective enforcement needs to
be supported by government, business, and civil society organization
initiatives. Consumer organizations are weak in South Africa, and
consumers generally are not aware of competition law and policy, and how
complaints may be brought to the Commission, and even the Tribunal.

69 NEO CHABANE, JOHANNES MACHAKA, NKULULEKO MOLABA,

SIMON ROBERTS, &

IfLTON TAKA, 10 YEAR REVIEW: INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE AND COMPETITION POLICY (2003),
available
at
http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0000875/docs/
1OyerReviewlndustrialStructure&CompetitionPolicy.pdf.
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VII. CONCLUDING COMMENTS: COMPETITION AND
DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA
South Africa's historically high levels of concentration in both its
markets and in corporate ownership, as well as other features of the
business environment, have important implications for the competition
environment, investment, growth, and development prospects of the
country.
High levels of market concentration in many industries across the
manufacturing sector, as well as in the services sector and even in
agriculture, require a strong focus on the structural features of markets. It
may well be that this consideration has played a role in the allocation of
resources to merger regulation since the implementation of the 1998
Competition Act. Merger control is arguably relatively easier to enforce
than restrictive practices prohibitions, and in these early years of the new
Competition Authorities, it has been argued that this focus on merger
control enhances the credibility and reputation of these authorities.
While this may be true, it is also evident that not many merger
transactions have been denied. It must be acknowledged that the process of
merger control has focused the attention of business on competition matters
and the powers of the Competition Authorities. The open question is
whether this has contributed to the development of a competition culture in
South Africa by changing the behavior of firms.
South Africa's competition law and policy includes a unique focus on
specific dimensions of public interest, and this makes it possible to take into
account matters such as employment, specific industry development, and
small business development, as well as black economic empowerment,
which can play a very significant role in the long term process of
developing the nation's markets. Making markets work better with
appropriate intervention to guide market forces to support broader
development priorities, is absolutely essential to developing countries in
general, and to South Africa in particular, in light of its particular legacy of
economic development.
This consists of much more than effective
enforcement of merger regulation. The recent focus on restrictive practices
is therefore most important.
Beyond effective enforcement, the
development of a competition culture in South Africa also requires a strong
focus on competition advocacy.
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